Williamsburg, VA., May 4-5 1862. 3rd and 4th Army
Corps and Cavalry, Army of the Potomac. Upon the evacuation of
Yorktown by the Confederates, Gen. McClellan, commanding the Army of
the Potomac, ordered his cavalry, with four batteries of horse
artillery, under the command of Brig.-Gen. George Stoneman, in
pursuit, the infantry following as rapidly as possible. The 3rd corps,
commanded by Brig.-Gen. S.P. Heintzelman, moved on the direct road
from Yorktown to Williamsburg, with Hooker's division in advance
closely followed by Kearny's. The 4th corps, under command of
Brig.-Gen. E.D. Keyes, took the Lee's Mill road farther to the left,
Smith's division having the advance with the divisions of Couch and
Casey in supporting distance. Near the Half-way house - so called
because it was about half way between Yorktown and Williamsburg -
Stoneman's advance encountered some of the enemy's cavalry and the
skirmishing commenced. Knowing that the Confederates were moving on
both roads, Stoneman sent Emory's brigade to cut off the enemy on the
Lee's Mill road, while he engaged the force in his front, gradually
pressing it back to Fort Magruder, about a mile from Williamsburg.
Fort Magruder was the largest of a line of redoubts which had been
constructed sometime before by Gen. Magruder, commanding the
Confederate forces on the lower peninsula. When Stoneman came in sight
this was the only one of the redoubts occupied, but Gen. J.E.
Johnston, who was conducting the retreat, hurried troops to the rear
to man the trenches before Stoneman's supports could come up. Emory
encountered a regiment of Confederate cavalry on the Lee's Mill road,
under the command of Gen. Stuart himself, but without infantry could
not corner the enemy. Some confusion arose in the movements of the
Federal infantry. McClellan had remained at Yorktown to direct the
movements of Franklin's division of McDowell's corps, which had been
ordered to the peninsula, and Sumner was assigned to the command of
the forces in pursuit. Heintzelman was in the advance before Sumner,
and in his report states that his instructions directed him to "take
control of the entire movement." When Smith's division reached Skiff
creek, on the left-hand road, the bridge was found to have been
destroyed and Sumner ordered him to take a cross-road to the one on
which the other column was moving. This brought Smith into the other
road near the Half-way house just as Hooker's troops came up, forcing
Hooker to halt for about 3 hours until Smith's command could get out
of the way. Hooker then followed Smith for some 3 miles, when he
crossed over to the road that the latter had left, and where Emory's
cavalry was operating. Smith's division came up with Stoneman about
5:30 p.m. and by Sumner's direction was formed in three lines of
battle to charge the enemy's works. About 6:30 the order was given to
advance, but the dense undergrowth in the woods soon made it apparent
that a charge over such ground was impracticable, and as darkness was
coming on the troops were halted under instructions to attack at
daylight the next morning.
The attack on the 5th was commenced by Hooker's division, which had
marched until 11 o'clock the night before, and at 5:30 a.m. was within
sight of the enemy's works before Williamsburg. Two hours later Gen.
Grover was ordered to begin the attack by sending the 1st Mass. to the
left and the 2nd N.H. to the right of the road as skirmishers, under
instructions to advance to the edge of the timber, where they were to
turn their attention to the occupants of the rifle-pits in their
front, as well as to the sharp-shooters and gunners in Fort Magruder.
The 11th Mass. and 26th Pa. were then sent to the right of the 2nd N.H.
and ordered to advance as skirmishers until they reached the Yorktown
road. Webber's battery was next pushed forward into an open field on
the right of the road, but before the guns could be brought into
action it was subjected to such a heavy fire from Fort Magruder and a
battery on the left that the cannoneers were forced to retire.
Volunteers were called for to man the battery and the men of Osborn's
battery dashed to the deserted guns, placed them in position and
opened fire on the fort and the battery mentioned. Bramhall's battery
was then brought up on the right of Webber's, and by 9 o'clock the
guns of the forts were silenced, the Confederates in the rifle-pits
having in the meantime been driven back by the well-directed fire of
Hooker's sharpshooters. Leaving the 5th N.J. to support the batteries,
Gen. Patterson moved with the rest of his brigade to the left of the
road in anticipation of an attack from that direction, and the heavy
firing there soon demonstrated that the anticipation was being
realized. Patterson found himself confronted by Pryor's and Pickett's
brigades, outnumbering his own command five to one, and twice sent
back for reinforcements, but receiving none gave the order to retire.
The 73rd and 74th N.Y., the only remaining regiments of Hooker's
reserve, were ordered to the left, and with their assistance Patterson
rallied his men and repulsed the enemy three times after he had
advanced to within 80 yards of the road, which was the center of
operations. Hooker now ordered all his available troops to the left,
and they arrived just in time to meet a fourth assault by Longstreet's
whole division, which had just reached the field. At the same time the
guns from Fort Magruder opened again and another body of Confederate
troops advanced against Webber's and Bramhall's batteries, capturing 4
guns. Just then Berry's brigade of Kearny's division arrived on the
field and repulsed the attack on the batteries, saving the remainder
of the guns, the 5th Mich. charging with the bayonet and driving the
enemy back to the rifle-pits with a loss of 143 killed and a large
number wounded. Kearney's other two brigades - Birney's and Jameson's
- now came up and relieved Hooker's men, who retired to the rear,
where they replenished their ammunition and remained in reserve. The
Confederates, seeing that the Union line had been strengthened by the
arrival of these fresh troops, gave up the attempt to turn Hooker's
left and retired to their intrenchments.
Smith's attack, which was to begin at daylight, did not commence
until about noon. Late on the evening of the 4th Sumner learned from a
countryman that the redoubts on the Confederate left were unoccupied.
A reconnaissance the next morning verified the information, and
Hancock was ordered to move with his own brigade, part of Davidson's,
and Cowan's N.Y. battery and occupy the redoubts. Hancock crossed Cub
Dam creek on a narrow bridge, threw forward the 5th Wis. and 6th Me.
as an assaulting party in case the redoubt should be occupied by the
enemy. Finding it unoccupied he left three companies to hold it,
formed a skirmish line in an open field to the rear, with the main
body of his infantry behind in line of battle, the artillery in the
center, and moved against another redoubt farther down the stream.
This was also found to be unoccupied and was taken possession of by
Hancock, who now sent back to Smith for reinforcements to enable him
to hold the advantage he had gained. He then moved forward to drive
the enemy from the two nearest works in his front and create a
diversion in favor of Hooker, who was then seriously engaged in front
of Fort Magruder. Deploying his line on a crest, with the artillery on
the right and left of the redoubt, he threw forward a strong skirmish
line and drove the enemy from his position, but did not take
possession of it as the reinforcements had not arrived. Sumner had
twice ordered reinforcements to Hancock, but each time had
countermanded the order. Upon a third request for reinforcements he
ordered Hancock to fall back to his first position. Doubtful as to
whether this meant the firt fort occupied or to retire across the
creek, Hancock determined to hold on until he could communicate with
Sumner, and again sent back for reinforcements, directing the officer
to state the importance of holding the position. In his report Hancock
says: "While I was awaiting a reply to this message the crisis of the
battle in front of Fort Magruder appeared to have arrived, and in
order to furnish all the assistance possible our Battery threw
percussion shell into that fort." This action drew attention to
Hancock. Artillery was turned on him and D.H. Hill advanced with a
heavy force of infantry to drive him from his position. Hill soon
occupied the redoubts and Hancock's skirmishers became engaged with
this force, while a cavalry column came out from behind a point of
woods on the right. This was held in check by the skirmishers,
however, and Hancock gave the order to fall back to the crest and form
in line of battle. This was taken for a retreat by the enemy, who now
advanced. Hancock's men behind the crest waited until the Confederates
were within easy range, when they suddenly appeared over the top of
the hill and poured a murderous volley of musketry into the line
rushing up the opposite slope. "Now, gentlemen, the bayonet!" cried
Hancock, and the whole brigade charged with a vigor that threw the
enemy into utter rout and drove him from the field with a loss of
about 400 men in killed, wounded and captured. McClellan, in his
report, refers to this action of Hancock's as being "one of the most
brilliant engagements of the war." It was the relieving feature of the
battle of Williamsburg, an engagement fought without a plan, without
unity of action on the part of the different commands, and practically
without a commander. The repulse of Hill came about 5:30 p.m. Before
he could reform his shattered lines to renew the attack darkness came
on and the Confederates in front of Hancock bivouacked in line of
battle, expecting to be attacked during the night. Late in the
afternoon Peck's brigade of Couch's division came up and took position
on the right of Hooker, where he held his position until the action
was over. Had he arrived sooner Sumner might have been able to
reinforce Hancock, thus enabling him to press the advantage he had
gained on the Confederate left, which would no doubt have resulted in
a sweeping victory for the Union arms. About the time that Hill was
driven back loud and prolonged cheering was heard at Sumner's front,
announcing the arrival of McClellan on the field. The enemy, however,
regarded it as a signal that heavy reinforcements had come up, and
during the night Johnston evacuated his position, continuing his
retreat toward Richmond.
The Union losses in the battle of Williamsburg were 456 killed,
1,410 wounded and 373 captured or missing. The Confederate reports
show a loss of 288 killed, 975 wounded and 297 missing, but
Heintzelman, in his report, says: "In the town the enemy abandoned all
their severely wounded without attendance or the least provision for
their sustenance. Counting them, the prisoners captured during the
battle and the first day of the retreat, we got about 1,000 men; among
them one colonel and several other officers. Up to Saturday 800 rebels
were buried by our troops."
Source: The Union Army, Volume 5, Cyclopedia of Battles A - Helena ,
1908 |