| Champion's Hill, Miss., May 16, 1863. Parts of the
13th, 15th and 17th Army Corps. On the 13th Gen. Johnston reached
Jackson. His idea was that the Confederate forces east of Vicksburg
should be united and a battle fought which would decide the fate of
that city. To this end he sent a despatch to Gen. Pemberton, then at
Bovine, directing him to attack the Federals at Clinton (about 10
miles west of Jackson), and promised to cooperate in the movement.
Pemberton's idea was that he should remain near Vicksburg, in order to
defend the place and at the same time be near his base. He therefore
called a council of war and laid Johnston's suggestion - it could
hardly be called an order - before his officers. A majority expressed
themselves in favor of it and Pemberton sent a reply to Johnston,
closing with these words: "In directing this move, I do not think you
fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg will be left in, but I
comply at once with your order." Subsequently he sent another despatch,
announcing his intention to move on the morning of the 15th, via
Dillon, on the Raymond and Port Gibson road, in an effort to cut off
the Federal communications, and added: "I do not consider my force
sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position or to attempt
to cut my way to Jackson." Although an order was promulgated on the
evening of the 14th for the troops to be ready to move early the next
morning, it was 1 p.m. before the advance guard left Edwards' station,
near the point where the Vicksburg & Jackson railroad crosses the Big
Black river. This delay of more than 24 hours prevented the successful
culmination of Johnston's plans, for on the 14th he was compelled to
evacuate Jackson and fall back on the Canton road.
Having driven Johnston from Jackson, Grant disposed his forces so
as to prevent his forming a junction with Pemberton, and at the same
time made preparations to attack the latter. From the Bolton and
Raymond road three roads led to Edwards' station. On the 15th the
troops were moved westward to occupy these roads. At 6 a.m. on the
16th Hovey's division of McClernand's corps (the 13th) was at the
cross-roads just south of Bolton, with Logan's and Crocker's divisions
of McPherson's corps (the 17th) a short distance in the rear. These
three divisions were to move on the north road to Champion's hill. ON
the middle road were Osterhaus' and Carr's divisions of the 13th
corps, and on the south road was A.J. Smith's division of the same,
supported by Blair's division of the 15th. Thus arranged the whole
army moved forward, ready to assume either the offensive or defensive
as circumstances might require.
Pemberton's forces encamped on the night of the 15th on a
cross-road south of Champion's hill. About 6:30 a.m. on the 16th a
courier arrived with a despatch from Johnston, in which he said: "Our
being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The
only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton,
and informing me that we may move to that point with about six
thousand." Having wasted over a day in trying to get to the Federal
rear to cut off communications, Pemberton now decided to follow
Johnston's suggestions. Accordingly orders were issued for the trains
to clear the road so that the troops could countermarch to Edwards'
station, from which place they were to move over the Brownsville road
to join Johnston. But it was too late. Before the movement could be
executed Smith's advance was driving Loring's pickets on the Raymond
road. Pemberton selected a strong position on the hills along the
right bank of Baker's creek with Loring's division forming his right,
Bowen's the center and Stevenson's on the left. His line was hardly
formed before Hovey's skirmishers had engaged those of Stevenson near
the foot of the hill on Champion's plantation, from which the battle
takes its name. About 10 o'clock Grant joined Hovey, who was then
forming his men for an assault on Stevenson's position, but the
commanding general directed him to wait until word was received that
McClernand was ready. McClernand had been delayed in driving in the
enemy pickets and artillery. At 9:45 a.m. he sent a messenger to Grant
to inquire whether he should bring on an engagement. That despatch was
not received until noon. Grant promptly sent back orders for him to
attack in force, and later sent word to "push forward with all
rapidity." The attack was not made until 2 p.m., and was not then as
vigorous as it might have been.
Meantime McPherson's men had reached the field and Hovey's two
brigades were deployed on the left of the road, Logan's division being
formed on the right. At 10:30 Hovey's skirmishers advanced steadily up
the slope, followed by McGinnis and Slack with the two brigades, and
in a little while the engagement became general. Stevenson was forced
back for over 600 yards, losing 11 pieces of artillery and about 300
prisoners. The Confederates were rallied under cover of the woods and
in turn advanced, forcing the Federals back down the hill. Boomer's
brigade of Quinby's (Crocker's) division and two regiments, the 10th
Mo. and 17th Ia., were now sent to Hovey's assistance, but the whole
line, reinforcements and all, was forced back to a point near the brow
of the hill. Up to this time the irregularity of the Union lines
prevented the use of artillery in enfilading the enemy's, but when the
retreat was checked Hovey ordered the 1st Mo. and part of the 16th
Ohio batteries in position on his right; two sections of the latter
and the 6th Wis. battery on the left, and for a little while poured an
incessant shower of shot and shell into the enemy, not only checking
his advance, but also turning it into a retreat. With a cheer the
Union forces advanced and this time held the position that had been so
hotly contested three times within as many hours.
While these events were transpiring on the hill Smith's and
Leggett's brigades of Logan's division had advanced against the
northern slope of the hill on the right of Hovey. As they advanced the
3rd brigade, under Gen. Stevenson, was thrown still further to the
right, made a quick march across a ravine, cut off Barton's and Lee's
brigades from the main body of the confederate left and captured 7
pieces of artillery. This action turned the tide of battle. Barton's
brigade was driven across Baker's creek, while Lee's and Cumming's
fell back in disorder toward the Raymond road. In the heat of the
engagement on the hill Pemberton ordered Loring to send reinforcements
to Bowen and Stevenson. Buford's brigade was first moved to the left,
closely followed by that of Featherston, but neither reached the scene
in time to prevent the disaster. Loring was then ordered to form his
men between the Clinton and Raymond roads to cover the retreat. The
two brigades were recalled to join Tilghman's, which was resisting the
attacks of Osterhaus and Smith, in which Tilghman was killed. The
whole division was cut off from the main body and compelled to make a
long, circuitous detour to the south, and the next day reported to
Johnston his arrival at Crystal Springs, "without baggage, wagons or
cooking utensils." The next day part of Pemberton's command made a
feeble stand at Big Black river (q.v.), after which the remnants of
his shattered army retired to Vicksburg and the siege commenced. In
this engagement at Champion's the Union losses were 410 killed, 1,844
wounded and 187 missing. The Confederates lost 380 killed, 1,018
wounded and 2,441 missing. In his report Pemberton says he had 17,500
men engaged at Champion's hill, though subsequent estimates place the
strength of his army at nearly 24,000. The Union forces numbered about
32,000, though all were not actively engaged, the brunt of the battle
being borne by Hovey and Logan. This engagement was the turning point
of the Vicksburg campaign, and had Pemberton promptly obeyed
Johnston's order of the 13th, thus effecting a union of the two
armies, the history of that campaign might have been differently
written.
Source: The Union Army, Volume 6, Cyclopedia of Battles,
1908 |