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Battle of Pea Ridge or Elkhorn Tavern, Arkansas
in the American Civil War
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Union Battle Summary |
| Pea Ridge, Ark., March 6-8, 1862. Army of the
Southwest. About the middle of February, 1862, Maj.-Gen. Samuel R.
Curtis, after completing the organization of the Army of the
Southwest, entered Springfield, Mo., to find that it had been
evacuated by Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price and his Confederate army. Curtis
followed by forced marches, skirmishing with Price's rear-guard across
the Arkansas line, where the enemy took refuge in the Boston
mountains. Upon reaching Fayetteville Curtis withdrew to await an
attack on ground of his own choosing. The army was not widely
separated, but it was essential that some division be made of it for
purposes of obtaining forage. The location of the different potions
was as follows: the 1st and 2nd divisions, jointly under the command
of Brig.-Gen. Franz Sigel and individually under Col. Peter J.
Osterhaus and Brig.-Gen. Alexander Asboth, were on Cooper's farm 4
miles southwest of Bentonville; the 3rd division, under Col. Jefferson
C. Davis, was at Sugar creek, where the preliminary arrangements were
made for a stand; the 4th division, under command of Col. Eugene A.
Carr, was at Cross Timber hollow, 12 miles north of Sugar creek. About
2 p.m. of the 5th Curtis learned that the combined forces of Price and
McCulloch, together with some five regiments of Indians under Gen.
Albert Pike, all under the command of Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, were
moving on the Federal position. Orders were immediately sent for a
concentration on Davis at Sugar creek. Carr's division, with the
exception of Col. William Vandever's brigade, which was out foraging,
started its march about 6 p.m. Vandever, however, received the news of
Van Dorn's movement before Curtis' messenger reached him, and by
forced marches reached Sugar creek on the 6th. Curtis, at the head of
Carr's division, arrived at Sugar creek at 2 a.m. of the 6th and
immediately set about erecting field works and felling trees to
obstruct the enemy's progress. Early in the morning Davis and Carr
took position on a hill commanding the creek valley, which at that
point is from a quarter to a half mile wide. The valley intercepts
three roads - the Telegraph pike on the east, the Bentonville and
Keetsville road on the west, and a branch of the latter road, which is
nearly parallel to and 3 miles from the Telegraph road. During the
morning Col. Grenville M. Dodge directed the felling of trees across
all three roads. About 2 p.m. Asboth and Osterhaus reported with their
divisions and shortly afterward it was learned that Sigel, who had
remained at Bentonville for two hours with a detachment, had been
surrounded and attacked at that point by Van Dorn's advance. The 1st
and 2nd divisions were immediately hurried to his assistance,
Osterhaus in the advance. Four miles from camp Osterhaus met Sigel
fighting his way, and the artillery of the division was brought into
action, which drove the enemy back. The divisions then took position
along Sugar creek, with Asboth forming the right, then Osterhaus,
Davis and Carr in order. In front of them was the deep valley of Sugar
creek and in their rear was the broken plateau called Pea ridge. The
road from Bentonville would have brought Van Dorn's forces in contact
with Curtis; extreme right, but no assault was made that night. Rather
than attack in a position which Curtis had chosen Van Dorn moved his
force so as to outflank the Federals on their right and gain their
rear by proceeding up the Bentonville and Keetsville pike and coming
upon them from the direction of Cross Timber hollow and Elkhorn
tavern. The trees which Dodge had felled on the 6th so effectually
delayed the movement that Curtis had ample time on the following
morning to make a change of front. The 1st and 2nd divisions became
the left of the line with their left resting on Sugar creek; Osterhaus
was ordered to take a detachment of light artillery, some cavalry and
an infantry support and open the fight against the enemy's center.
This force with Davis' division formed the Federal center, and Carr's
division took the extreme right. About 10:30 a.m. it was reported that
the pickets at Elkhorn tavern on the Telegraph road, about three and a
half miles above the Sugar creek encampment, had been driven in. It
was at this point that Carr's right was to rest. Osterhaus immediately
advanced against the Confederate center, composed of the commands of
McIntosh and Hebert and the Indians, and succeeded in breaking the
enemy's advancing line. A greatly superior force was brought against
him, however, and he was compelled to retire, losing in the movement
his flying battery. His infantry support after some desperate fighting
checked the Confederate advance, but Curtis thought the position so
strategic that he countermanded an order to Davis to support Carr and
sent him to assist Osterhaus. It was at the center of the Union line
that the fight raged the most furiously at first, but Davis' line held
like a stone wall and Van Dorn was compelled to adopt other tactics.
Carr had met some trouble in repelling the attacks on him and Van Dorn
determined to force that part of the line. At the first call for
reinforcements from the right Curtis sent his body-guard and a
detachment of mountain howitzers, but notwithstanding this the
Confederates still held the advantage. Carr again asked for
reinforcements, stating that he could not hold out much longer, and
was sent a battalion of infantry and 3 pieces of artillery. Each
augmentation of the Union right seemed to result in a still larger
addition to the Confederate force opposed to it. At 2 p.m. no attack
had been made on Sigel and Asboth on Sugar creek, and Curtis resolved
to bring one or both of those divisions into the action. Asboth was
moved by the direct road to Elkhorn tavern and Sigel with Osterhaus'
division proceeded by way of Leetown to reinforce Davis, or if not
needed at that point to come to Carr's assistance. Curtis himself
accompanied Asboth and about 5 p.m. came to where Carr was stationed.
The latter's division after 7 hours of constant fighting was still
stubbornly engaging the enemy. Asboth's artillery was planted in the
Telegraph road and opened a heavy fire at close range, continuing it
until a lack of ammunition compelled it to fall back. Darkness closed
in while the troops were still in the same relative positions. Curtis
immediately began the formation of a new line of battle. Davis was
drawn back from his center position and ordered to take the ground at
Carr's left. About 2 a.m. of the 8th Sigel reported and with Asboth
was sent to take position on the left. The 1st and 2nd divisions under
Sigel were not yet in position when day broke, but the enemy did not
renew the attack. Davis' division opened the fight of the third day,
but no sooner had it done so than the enemy replied from a new line
and from new batteries established during the night. The Federal right
fell back a distance to avoid a raking fire, and in the meantime the
left took position, the line then extending from the mountain on the
left, commanded by Sigel's 2nd division, in a southeasterly direction
across the Telegraph road to where Carr's division, somewhat refused,
held the right. On the extreme right was a slight eminence some
distance in advance of the main line, on which Curtis located the
Dubuque battery, and had Carr move forward his right to support it,
thus giving direction for the advance of the whole right wing. Other
batteries were moved forward in the same way all along the line. As
each battery sent forward by Sigel's two division on the right would
drive the Confederates back from their front they would wheel with
deployed infantry support half to the right. These tactics, repeated
along the whole left, kept the Confederate right dropping back, and
before many hours the Union line was a huge semi-circle, the Dubuque
battery its right end, the left of Asboth's division the left end,
enclosing within it Van Dorn's army. It was next to impossible for the
Confederates to withstand the concentrated cross-fire of the
converging Union line and before noon they had stopped firing. It was
soon discovered that Van Dorn was fleeing north through the gorge
where the Telegraph road passes. Pursuit was made by Sigel along the
Keetsville road to intercept the enemy at the junction of that road
with the Telegraph, but it was afterwards found that the main force of
Van Dorn's army after entering the gorge had turned short to the right
into the ravines and passes that led into the Huntsville road in a
direction due south. The losses in this engagement were 203 killed,
980 wounded and 201 captured or missing on the Federal side. The
Confederate casualties were never definitely ascertained, but were
undoubtedly fully as heavy. The affair is called by the Confederates
the battle of Elkhorn Tavern.
Source: The Union Army, Volume 6, Cyclopedia of Battles,
1908 |
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