Union Battle Summary

In proposing his plan of campaign McDowell estimated the Confederate strength at Manassas at 25,000 men, and asked for 30,000 to take into action, with a reserve of 10,000 more. His greatest fear seems to have been that Beauregard would be reinforced, for in presenting his plan he said: "If Gen. J.E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Maj.-Gen. Patterson, and Maj.-Gen. Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity, I think they will not be able to bring up more than 10,000 men, so we may calculate upon having to do with about 35,000 men." Scott assured him that Patterson would keep Johnston too busy to permit him to join Beauregard, and added: "If Johnston joins Beauregard, he shall have Patterson on his heels." Events proved, however, that Scott was mistaken in his estimate of Patterson as a military commander. Johnston did join Beauregard, just in the nick of time, and Patterson was nowhere near his heels. Some delay occurred in the preparations, so that it was the 16th before McDowell was ready to move. His army was composed of five divisions. The 1st division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler, consisted of four brigades, the 1st commanded by Col. E.D. Keyers, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. R.C. Schenck, the 3rd by Col. W.T. Sherman, and the 4th by Col. I.B. Richardson. The 2nd division was under the command of Col. David Hunter, and was made up of two brigades, commanded by Cols. Andrew Porter and A.E. Burnside. The 3rd division, under Col. S.P. Heintzelman, consisted of three brigades, commanded by Cols. W.B. Franklin, O.B. Willcox and O.O. Howard. The 4th division, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Theodore Runyon, was held in reserve and took no part in the engagement. The 5th division, commanded by Col. S.D. Miles, was also in reserve at Centerville, and was not in the battle proper, though it was engaged in skirmishing during the 21st and in covering the retreat of the army. It was composed of the brigades of Cols. Louis Blenker and T.A. Davies. With the army were 49 pieces of artillery.

The Confederate Army of the Potomac, commanded by Brig.-Gen. G.T. Beauregard, consisted of six brigades of Bonham, Ewell, D.R. Jones, Longstreet, Cocke and Early; the reserve brigade of Holmes; Evans' command, temporarily organized; two regiments of unattached infantry; the 30th Va.; ten independent companies of cavalry; and 27 field guns. The army of the Shenandoah, commanded by Gen. J.E. Johnston, was composed of four brigades, respectively commanded by Jackson, Bartow, Bee and E.K. Smith; the 1st Va. cavalry, under J.E.B. Stuart; and 17 pieces of artillery.

As above stated, McDowell marched on the 16th, the men carrying three days' rations. The next day he drove in the enemy's outposts at Fairfax C.H., and on the 18th halted at Centerville for his supply train to come up, so that more rations could be issued. On that day Tyler made a reconnaissance (see Blackburn's Ford) that developed the Confederate position and demonstrated that the enemy was in force. The Confederate line of battle lay along the west side of Bull run and extended from Manassas Junction to the stone bridge on the Warrenton turnpike, a distance of about 8 miles. Between the railroad and the stone bridge were five fords, viz.: Lewis', Ball's, Mitchell's, Blackburn's and McLean's, from north to south in the order named. Up to the time of the affair at Blackburn's ford it had been McDowell's intention to turn the enemy's right, then cross at one of the fords and attack the center. The roads south of the junction were found to be unsuitable for a flank movement in that direction, and Tyler's reconnaissance showed the enemy to be too strong at the fords for the Union troops to force a passage without suffering heavy losses. McDowell, therefore, turned his attention to the Confederate left. During the 19th and 20th he caused his engineers to make a careful examination of the ground between the two armies, and to gain as much information as possible of the enemy's position. Two fords were found above the stone bridge, Sudley ford, the one farthest north, being unguarded. On Saturday evening, the 20th, McDowell called his officers together at Centerville and explained his plans for battle on the succeeding day. Miles was to remain at Centerville with his division and construct defensive works there to be used in case of emergency; Richardson's brigade was to be detached from Tyler's division for the purpose of making a demonstration against Blackburn's ford, to engage the enemy's attention in the center; the rest of Tyler's division was to march out on the pike to the stone bridge and threaten the enemy at that point, while Hunter and Heintzelman were to march with their divisions to Sudley ford, cross the run and then, turning to the left, force away the guard from the other ford and the bridge, thus clearing the way for Tyler to cross and join in the attack on Beauregard's left. Tyler was instructed to move at 2:30 a.m. and to be in position to open fire on the bridge at daybreak. His demonstration was to be sufficiently vigorous to divert attention from Hunter and Heintzelman. Unfortunately Tyler started behind time and his march was so slow as to hold back Hunter and Heintzelman for some time. Then the distance to Sudley ford was about twice as great as had been reported, so that the run was not crossed until 9:30 instead of 6 o'clock, according to the original schedule.

The stone bridge was guarded by Evans, who had about a regiment and a half of infantry and 4 pieces of artillery. Tyler's demonstration was so feeble that Evans was soon convinced it was only a feint and that the real attack was to come from some other quarter. About 8 o'clock he heard of the column moving toward Sudley ford. Withdrawing all his force from the bridge, with the exception of four companies and 2 guns, he moved to the Sudley road to intercept the flank movement. This movement of Evans was made without the knowledge or the orders of his superior officers, but it displayed good military judgment, and no doubt changed the whole current of battle. He took up a position north of the Warrenton pike, on a ridge north of Young's branch, his left resting on the Sudley road. At 10 a.m. the head of Hunter's column emerged from the woods about a mile north of the pike and the battle of Bull run was commenced by Burnside's brigade and Evans' line.

Johnston arrived at Manassas about noon on the 20th with the first detachment of the Army of the Shenandoah, and, being the ranking officer, assumed command. Patterson was not "on his heels," as Scott had promised, but he might arrive at any time, and it was decided to crush McDowell before Patterson could reinforce him. Beauregard, who was well acquainted with the ground, proposed a plan of battle, which was approved by Johnston, and that was to cross Bull run at the fords below the stone bridge with the whole strength of the combined armies and attack McDowell at Centerville. The troops were posted with this view and early on Sunday morning Johnston had written the orders for an advance, but before they could be carried out the sound of artillery firing was heard in the direction of the stone bridge. It was then decided to attack on the right from Blackburn's ford and assume the defensive on the left. Accordingly orders were given for Ewell, on the extreme right, to begin the flank movement on Centerville, the other commands to follow in order to the left, while the commands of Bee and Bartow were to support Evans. The reserves were to move without further orders to where the sound of the firing was heaviest.

When the fighting on the left began, Burnside formed his brigade in line of battle and moved forward to the support of a battery in the open field east of the Sudley road. Prompt action on his part would doubtless have forced Evans from his position, but Evans was quickly reinforced by part of Bee's command and the opportunity was lost. Evans was also reinforced by Bartow's brigade and Imboden's battery. Porter's brigade came to the assistance of Burnside and formed to the right of the Sudley road, where Griffin's battery of 6 guns could be brought to bear on the enemy's artillery. Heintzelman also hurried up his advance regiment and Rickett's battery, and under the attack of these combined forces the Confederate line broke and fell back in some confusion about half a mile across Young's branch. The Sudley road crosses the Warrenton pike about three-fourths of a mile west of the stone bridge. At the junction of the two roads was a stone house. About half a mile east, on the south side of the pike, was the Robinson house, and about the same distance west of the cross-roads on the north side of the pike was the Dogan house, while further south, on the east side of the Sudley road, was another dwelling, known as the Henry house. South of this last was a semicircular wood, extending from the Sudley road to Young's branch, and between the wood and the pike was a plateau, over which the Confederates retreated. It was at this point that Gen. T.J. Jackson received the sobriquet of "Stonewall." His brigade was in line near the edge of the wood, waiting for the command to go in, when Bee's men came flying back across the plateau. "Look!" called out Bee in an attempt to rally his forces, "Here is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!" From that time forth the famous Confederate general was known as "Stonewall" Jackson, and there are probably thousands of people who know him by no other name.

This first repulse of the Confederates came about 11:30 a.m. Some time before this Johnston and Beauregard realized that McDowell's demonstration on their left was a real attack, the order for the flank movement on Centerville was recalled, and the troops ordered to the scene of the conflict. McDowell, who was early on the field, also ordered up all his available forces to the support of those engaged. Tyler sent the brigades of Sherman and Keyes across the run at the ford above the stone bridge, Keyes joining Hunter on the left, while Sherman moved to the right to the support of Porter, who was still pressing the enemy down the Sudley road. Along the crest in front of the wood Jackson, with his five regiments and two batteries, formed a new line, extending from the Robinson to the Henry house, and behind this the defeated Confederates were partially rallied. Hampton's battalion, which had arrived from Richmond that morning, formed on Jackson's right. Franklin and Willcox joined the Union line on the right a little afternoon, and Griffin's and Rickett's batteries secured a position near the Dogan house, where they could enfilade Hampton's line. About 2 p.m. Keyes made a dashing charge up the hill, driving Hampton from his position, but was repulsed by the fire of some batteries which had just been planted farther to the rear. The whole Federal line now swung around toward the pike, striking Jackson on the left and forcing him back to the shelter of the woods, where he concentrated his artillery so as to sweep by a cross fire the whole open plateau in his front. To counteract this fire Griffin and Ricketts pushed their batteries forward to the Henry hill, with two regiments in support. For a brief period there was a lull in the battle, but before the Union guns were fairly in position men and horses commenced to fall under a well-directed fire from the Confederate sharpshooters concealed in the thicket of pines at short range. The guns were placed, however, and fire opened on the enemy's lines, driving the sharpshooters from their place of concealment. Here a mistake occurred that proved to be one of the prime factors in the defeat of McDowell's army. A regiment approached the batteries from the right in plain view. Griffin charged his guns with canister and trained them on the advancing line, when Maj. Barry, chief of artillery, assured him that it was a regiment coming to his support. Griffin ordered the gunners to withhold their fire, the regiment continued to advance until within short musket range, when they leveled their pieces and with one volley almost annihilated the batteries. Most of the horses were killed, and those that were left broke away and went tearing down the hill through the Union lines, scattering confusion among the troops. The 11th N.Y. (Ellsworth's zouaves), supporting the batteries, fired one volley and fled, upon which the Confederates swarmed out of the woods and charged the batteries, which now became the center of the fight. Jackson's men seized the guns and tried to drag them away, but were foiled in the attempt. Arnold's battery was brought to the assistance of Griffin and Ricketts, but was compelled to withdraw. The Rhode Island battery poured in a heavy fire from the hill north of Young's branch, fresh troops on either side were thrown forward and for an hour the battle raged around the two batteries. Three times the guns were taken and recaptured and just as victory was about to perch on the Union banner the remainder of the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah arrived on the field. Kirby Smith's brigade marched up the Sudley road from Manassas. Smith was wounded, but Col. Arnold Elzey assumed command and led the brigade to the left of the Confederate line. About the same time four regiments from Cocke's and Bonham's brigades came up nearer Bull run, thus extending the enemy's line in both directions until it overlapped McDowell's at either end. No more fresh troops could be brought up by McDowell, while the enemy was now constantly receiving accessions to his ranks. The guns of Griffin's and Rickett's batteries were in Jackson's hands, Ricketts was wounded and a prisoner, many of the Union regiments has exhausted their ammunition, and now at 4:30 p.m. there was nothing left but to retreat. McDowell made the best disposition he could to cover the retreat of the army and the word was passed along the lines to fall back to the old position at Centerville. The disorder which had been growing in the Federal lines all the afternoon now reached its climax. Although the Warrenton road was open to Centerville, a distance of about 4 miles, most of the troops went back by the same route they had come upon the field in the morning and made the long detour by way of Sudley ford. With few exceptions all regimental and brigade formations were entirely lost, every man being intent on getting to Centerville as soon as possible. Fortunately for the panic-stricken army of raw troops Johnston and Beauregard did not press the pursuit to the extent they might have done. Stuart's cavalry followed, but the rear of the army was fairly well protected and all the Confederates could do was to pick up a straggler here and there. Bonham was ordered to move against the retreating army, but the brigades of Sherman, Schenck and Keyes, which went by the pike, presented too formidable an appearance and the pursuit was a tame affair. Bonham followed, however, nearly to Centerville, where he encountered the brigades of Blenker, Richardson and Davies, and hurriedly fell back across Bull run.

While the main battle was taking place near the crossing of the Warrenton pike and the Sudley road a considerable skirmish occurred at Blackburn's ford. It will be remembered that Richardson was sent here to make a demonstration to divert attention from McDowell's real purpose. In the afternoon the Confederates became aware of the character of this movement and Johnston sent word to D.R. Jones to cross the run and attack Richardson, in the hope that McDowell would weaken his forces on the right to strengthen his position at the ford. Davies was sent to the support of Richardson, and with him was Hunt's battery. About 4 o'clock Jones crossed at McLean's ford, a short distance below Blackburn's, with three regiments, and by a flank movement tried to capture this battery. Davies, from a strong position, watched the movement until the regiments were beginning to deploy in line of battle, when he ordered the 6 guns shotted with canister, and at a distance of 500 yards opened on the advancing Confederates. One volley was sufficient. The enemy broke and fled, not stopping until he was safely on the other side of the run. Jones reported his loss here as 14 killed and 62 wounded. No further demonstration was made at this point and the Union troops retired toward Centerville.

The Union losses at Bull run were 460 killed, 1,124 wounded and 1,312 captured or missing. The Confederates lost 387 killed, 1,582 wounded and 13 missing.

Source: The Union Army, Volume 5, Cyclopedia of Battles A - Helena , 1908